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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-1956 TENNESSEE
SURVEY
JAMES B. EARLE*
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

Homicide: Involuntary manslaughter by automobile was involved
in the case of Smith v. State.' The evidence tended to show that while
the defendant was operating his automobile at a speed of possibly 40
miles per hour, he attempted to turn at a dead-end intersection, skidded
on loose gravel, and struck his victim at a point approximately four
feet off the street. It also appeared that the victim was a child of
six who was playing on a bridge leading to a school; that the accident
occurred on Christmas day; and that the defendant had consumed an
unknown quantity of intoxicating beverages at some time prior to the
accident. On these facts the conviction for involuntary manslaughter,
based on "willful and wanton negligence," was affirmed. Although
there was some evidence of consumption of intoxicants, it was pointed
out that the decision did not turn on that question so as to invoke
the malum in se theory applicable to a homicide committed by an
intoxicated driver, on which the leading Tennessee case is Keller v.
State.2 The court indicated, however, that the Keller decision continues to have vitality.3 The instant decision is important in that it
fills in another interstice in the distinction between "mere civil" or
"merely simple" negligence and criminal negligence. The Supreme
Court indicated its concern with making this distinction on this
particular set of facts. 4 However, application of this decision to future
cases is tempered by the court's reiteration that each case of this
sort must be determined on its particular facts.
Adequate provocation, so as to reduce a conviction of second degree
murder to voluntary manslaughter, was involved in the case of
Hargrove v. State.5 In that case the defendant went to the home of
his father-in-law, the deceased, to persuade his wife to return home
with him. The deceased requested the defendant to leave and,
when he refused, went to the telephone to call the police. Whereupon
the defendant shot him. The defendant alleged "many years of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 280 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1955).

2. 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803 (1927), 41 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1928).
3. 280 S.W.2d at 924. See comments on this question in Ball, Criminal Law
and Procedure-1954Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 825 (1954); 23 TENN.
L. REV. 437 (1954).
4. It is perhaps too facile to conclude that extraneous factors may have
persuaded the jury that the negligence in this case was criminal and not
merely civil.
5. 281 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. 1955).
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provocation and interference by deceased" into his affairs as the
producing cause of his sudden fit of anger. But that allegation treads
close to the line of proving premeditation, and the court quite properly restricted its consideration to the immediate producing cause
of the anger which it found to be the telephone call; and held that
6
such a lawful act might not be considered adequate provocation.
The causal connection between a wound and the death of the deceased was the problem in McCord v. State.7 The evidence was that
the defendant, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and
the deceased engaged in a fight; an admission by the defendant that
he struck the deceased with a knife; and the finding of the body of
the deceased (a young boy apparently in previous good health) some
hours after the fight with a wound in the left chest. The only direct
testimony as to the cause of death was that of an undertaker who expressed the opinion that the wound in the left chest had caused death,
although he had not probed the wound for depth nor conducted an
autopsy. In concluding that there was sufficient connective proof between the stabbing and the death the court referred to the production
of the knife as evidence of the probable depth of the wound and
cited cases for the well-established proposition that death may be
presumed to have resulted from a wound from which death might
ensue. But the absence of proof of the actual depth to which the knife
was inserted, whether it be a pen knife or a kris, would appear to
leave the conclusion somewhat shaky, there being only the opinion of
the undertaker to establish that the wound could have caused the
death.
Carnal Knowledge: Proof that the defendant actually committed an
act of sodomy per anus is not a variance from a charge of assault with
intent to carnally know a female under the age of twelve.8 The
Supreme Court held in Hale v. State9 that the gravamen of such an
assault is the guilty intent and not the consummation of the intent.
Burglary: The question of whether the statutory crime of burglary
in the second degree may be committed by a breaking and entering
in the night as well as in the daytime was considered in Ledger v.
State.'0 The offense in that case was committed at some time between Friday night and Sunday morning. The statute" defines second degree burglary as the breaking and entering of a dwellinghouse by day. The court, distinguishing a previous case, 12 held that
6. For a concise treatment of adequate provocation, see Perkins, The Law of
Homicide, 36 J. CRim. L., C. &P.S. 391, 412 (1946).
7. 278 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. 1955).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-606 (1956).
9. 281 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1955).
10. 285 S.W.2d 130 (Tenn. 1955).
11. TENN. CODE AwN. § 39-903 (1956).
12. Davis v. State, 43 Tenn. 77 (1866).
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the offense of second degree burglary was a lesser included offense
of that of burglary and that the term "by day" was included in the
statute not to create a new crime, but to authorize a lesser minimum
punishment. Thus, where the proof shows a breaking and entering
of a dwelling with felonious intent but fails to show the time, a conviction of burglary in the second degree may be sustained.
Constitutionality: The constitutionality of the 1951 act 1 3 providing
penalties for any person convicted of leaving the state without first
complying with a court order to pay support money for the support
of a child or children was upheld in Barger v. State.14 The attack
on the statute was made on the grounds of illegal discrimination and
violation of the privileges and immunities clause. The court held
that the classification of persons affected by the act was reasonable
and not discriminatory and that the penalty was not an unlawful
imprisonment for debt.
That portion of the 1939 act making it a misdemeanor to give or
offer premiums or other gratuities to induce a sale of motor fuel at
other than posted prices 15 was held to be beyond the police power
of the state in State v. White.16 The court held that although that
portion of the statute requiring the posting of prices of motor fuels
was properly a matter of legislative concern, the prohibition of offering inducements to prospective purchasers "does not relate to the
general welfare." "So long as the operator's business does not offend
the public morals and work an injustice on the public, its constitutional
right to pursue on equal terms to that allowed to others in like
business is beyond question, even though his methods may have a
tendency to draw trade to him to the detriment of competitors.' 17
In State v. Estes18 it was held that the offense of pulling down
the fence or leaving open the gate of another without permission,
for which the owner may recover a penalty, 19 is not an indictable
offense, notwithstanding that the term "misdemeanor" is used to
describe the offense.
The constitutionality of Chapter 267 of the Acts of 1955,20 establishing the jurisdiction of general sessions courts was challenged in
State v. Simmons.2 The validity of the statute was upheld as against
an attack that it was violative of the right to trial by jury.
13. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-219 (1956).
14. 280 S.W.2d 911 (Tenn. 1955).

15. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 59-1502 to -1504 (1956).
16. 288 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1956).

17. Id. at 430.
18.
19.
20.
21.

287 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. 1956).
TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-4530 (1956).
Id. § 40-118 (Supp. 1955).
287 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1955).
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Extradition: The courts, quite properly, continue to avoid a trial
on the merits in habeas corpus actions testing the validity of extradition proceedings. Alleged defects in the indictment brought in the
demanding state were raised as grounds for refusing extradition from
Tennessee in State ex rel. Sandford v. Cate22 and Reeves v. State
ex rel. Thompson.23 In the Sandford case the relator alleged that the
indictment, which was brought in North Carolina and which charged
him with embezzlement as a fiduciary, was premature. The court, citing Munsey v. Clough,24 held that this objection was a matter which
should not be inquired into by the courts of the asylum state, but
constituted a possible defense to be raised upon trial in the demanding
state. In the Thompson case the relator alleged that an indictment
brought in the demanding state which merely averred that the offense
was committed "in the fall of 1949" lacked specificity so as to support
an extradition warrant. The court referred to the Sandford case and
held that where evidence that the relator was not in the demanding
state during the period specified was not presented, the alleged defect
must be presented to the courts of the demanding state. In State ex
rel. Johnson v. Llewelyn;5 the relator alleged that his conviction in
the demanding state, Florida, was void because of a denial to him of
his constitutional right to due process of law because of a failure to appoint counsel for him. The court, quoting from State ex rel. Lea v.
Brown,26 held that the validity of the conviction in Florida must be
tested by the Florida courts and may not be raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding in Tennessee.
Arrest: Section 40-803 of the Tennessee Code provides in part that:
An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(2) When the person has committed a felony, though not in his presence.
(3) When a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable
cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
(4) On a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a
felony by the person arrested.
In an extensive article on the law of arrest in Tennessee 27 Professor
Rollin Perkins has suggested that subsection (2) of the above statute
has been over-looked entirely in considering whether an arrest without a warrant was lawful.2 The cases bear out this suggestion. In
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

285 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. 1955).
288 S.W.2d 451 (Tenn. 1956).
196 U.S. 364 (1905).
286 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. 1955).
166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2
Id. at 570.

VAND.

L. REV. 509 (1949).
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Simmons v. State29 it appeared that a highway patrolman had, upon
information, stopped and searched the defendant's automobile and
found therein six cases of whiskey. At the trial for illegal possession
(or transportation) of whiskey 30 there was, apparently, an objection
to the introduction of evidence as to the product of the search on
grounds that the search was conducted illegally as a part of an unlawful arrest. Upon conviction the defendant contended in his appeal
that the police officer must be required by the trial court to disclose
the name of the informant as a part of the proof of his "reasonable
cause" to believe that a felony had been or would be committed by
the defendant. On the first hearing of the case the Supreme Court
held that it was within the discretion of the trial court not to require the disclosure of the name of the informant in determining from
all the evidence whether there was a reasonable basis for the belief.
On petition for rehearing it was urged that prior opinions of the
court required the disclosure of the informant's name. The court
declined to change its previous ruling in the case. The court also went
further, and calling attention to the above statement by Professor
Perkins, implied that the provision of the statute authorizing an
officer to arrest when the person arrested has, in fact, committed a
felony would no longer be overlooked. To be sure, the court does not
appear to go as far in this regard as Professor Perkins would feel
justified. The latter states that:
One who has arrested the wrong person may be able to give an acceptable explanation of his mistake; but he certainly should be called
upon to explain. It does not make sense, however, to require one to explain how he happened to arrest the right person.3 1

The court, however, would appear to require that the arresting
officer have some information on which to base the arrest. Although
it is quite necessary to inquire rather searchingly as to the basis for an
officer's reasonable belief that a felony was about to be committed
where the arrest was made before the actual commission of the crime,
the same strictness should not apply to an arrest after the fact. In
every case some opportunity to question the legality of the arrest
may be necessary.
In Robertson v. State,3 for example, it appeared that an arrest was

made by highway patrol officers merely to satisfy their curiosity con29. 281 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1955).

30. It does not clearly appear from the report of the case whether a violation of TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2507 (1956) (illegal possession of whiskey),
or id. § 39-2509 (illegal transportation of whiskey) was involved in this
case. The former being a misdemeanor and the latter a felony where the
amount is more than one gallon, it seems likely that the latter section was
the one involved.
31. Perkins, supranote 27, at 571.
32. 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947).
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cerning a motorist, and the three gallons of whiskey which the officers
subsequently discovered was, in fact, a surprise to the officers. In
that case the court held the evidence so obtained as to the transportation of whiskey inadmissible on grounds that the search was illegal
as not accompanying a lawful arrest.
In Day v. Walton,33 the Tennessee Supreme Court had occasion to
reiterate the rule in Tennessee with respect to the degree of force
which may be exerted by an officer in attempting to effect an arrest
of a person guilty of a misdemeanor, as distinguished from a felony.
That case was a civil action involving a shooting by a special police
officer in order to arrest a person committing a misdemeanor in the
officer's presence. The victim was an innocent third person injured
by a stray bullet. In stating that an officer is never warranted in law
in shooting one guilty only of a misdemeanor to effect an arrest, the
court referred to the 1943 opinion of the Court of Appeals, Middle
Section, in the case of State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn.34 That case was
also a civil action for damages. A constable, in attempting to arrest
fleeing misdemeanants, fired into their automobile and caused it to
overturn injuring one and killing the other. It was argued that the
shooting into the automobile or at its tires was not equivalent to
shooting at the persons of the individuals and that such was the
"well-recognized method of stopping miscreants and law-breakers"
throughout the country. The court of appeals condemned such a
practice, however, and stated that "it is not only a civil wrong but
also a crime for a peace officer to use firearms so as to imperil life
or limb of a non-resisting, fleeing misdemeanant in an attempt to
arrest him or prevent his escape." 35
Searches: A search which is conducted incident to a lawful arrest,
although without a warrant, 'may, under appropriate circumstances,
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises
under his immediate control. '36 In Liakas v. State3 7 the question of
what may reasonably be searched in connection with the person arrested was considered. In that case the persons were arrested by
police officers upon a hue and cry with the fruits of a felony upon them.
The defendant also had in his possession a claim check for a parked car
which he attempted to dispose of while being searched. The officers
took the claim check, traced the car to its location in a commercial
parking building, and searched the car without obtaining a search
warrant. The fruits of another felony, the subject of the present
33. 281 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1955).

34. 282 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1943); see also, Perkins, supra note 27, at
596.
35. 282 S.W.2d at 207.
36. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947).
37. 286 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1956). Other aspects of this case are in Liakas v.
State, 288 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1956).
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prosecution, were found in the automobile. On appeal of a conviction for receiving stolen property, the defendant insisted that the
evidence obtained from the search of the automobile was inadmissible
as being the product of an unlawful search. The Supreme Court held,
however, that under all the circumstances the search was reasonable
as an incident to the arrest. This appears to extend the "premises"
of the arrest rather far and to make the reasonableness test of the
search depend upon the convenience of the searching officers who,
in failing to obtain a search warrant in this case, appeared to be
prompted by zeal for a prompt investigation rather than a necessity
for preserving evidence.
In Voss v. State38 it was held that a search conducted incident to
a lawful arrest may be reasonably continued after a brief hiatus
necessary to take the arrested persons to jail.
Venue: The sometimes bothersome question of the possibility of
a crime having been committed across county lines was raised in
Reynolds v. State.39 There was not, however, the usual question of
the commission of the offense partly in one and partly in another
40
county, which would have given jurisdiction to either county.
Nor was there the question of the commission of the offense on the
county boundary, where jurisdiction would similarly have been in
either county.41 In the case under discussion the only fact which
connected the offense (homicide) with the county was the finding of
the body of the victim in the county. The court quite reasonably
reached the conclusion that the location of the body in the county
raised a presumption that the offense had been committed in that
county, which presumption was rebuttable by evidence to the contrary.
Indictments: In State v. Youngblood 42 an indictment whose two
counts were dependent on each other for a complete statement of the
offense was quashed in the lower court. On appeal the Supreme
Court upheld the sufficiency of the indictment, citing an early Tennessee case 43 for the proposition that narrow technicality in the
drafting of indictments was not required. In Allen v. State44 a presentment for having impersonated "a peace officer" was attacked on the
grounds that it did not specify the particular officer impersonated. The
court held that, while it might have been better to have specified the
particular office which the defendants assumed, the defendants were
not misled as to the offense for which they were charged and the
38. 278 S.W.2d 667 (Tenn. 1955).

39. 287 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1956).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-105 (1956).

41. Id. § 40-106.
42. 287 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. 1956).

43. State v. Pearce, 7 Tenn. *66 (1823).

44. 288 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1956).
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defect was either waived by going to trial under a plea of not guilty
or else was cured by the verdict of guilty.
Jurors: Notwithstanding that in felony cases the charge to the
jury must be reduced to writing and the jury given the written
charge,45 literacy is not a qualification for jury service. In Kirkendoll
v. State46 the contention that the requirement for a written charge
necessitated a literate jury was answered by the observation that the
other jurors could read the charge aloud.
Section 40-2527 of the Tennessee Code authorizes the separation of
male and female jurors while outside the courtroom where the case
is being tried provided each member of the jury remains in the
custody of a duly sworn officer. In Steadman v. State47 this statute
was cited by the court as authorizing the separation of jury members
of different sex under proper guard for the purpose of allowing the
male jurors to watch a television program at the home of one of them.
In Harris v. State48 an allegation of error was made based on discrimination against a Negro juror because he was separated from the
other, white, jurors for lunch during the trial. The Supreme Court
stated that the Negro juror's ability to give a fair consideration to the
issues being tried was not affected by the separation, and further
that the court would not entertain a complaint by the defendant as to
alleged deprivation of rights of a juror.
Trial: Is present mental capacity to stand trial a matter of personal
privilege of the accused to raise or not, as he may desire? In Cogburn
v. State49 the Supreme Court, referring to the statute 50 authorizing
a commitment by the trial court of an individual under indictment
for observation as to his sanity, stated that not only was a plea of
present insanity not a matter of personal privilege but it was a matter
of duty on the part of the state to ascertain the mental competency
of the defendant to stand trial.
Former Jeopardy: In Wade v. Hunter5 ' the United States Supreme
Court said in respect to double jeopardy:
The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment, however, does
not mean that every time a defendant is put to trial before a competent
tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of the
type of oppressive practices at which the double-jeopardy prohibition
is aimed. There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a
45.

46.
tions
47.
48.

ANN. § 40-2516 (1956).
281 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1955). Other interesting questions as to qualificaand bias of jurors were also discussed in the case.
282 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1955).
1 RACE REL. L. REP. 401 (Tenn., Dec. 9, 1955).
TENN. CODE

49. 281 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1955).

50. TENN.

CODE

ANN. § 33-513 (1956).

51. 336 U.S. 684, 688 (1948).
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trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to
agree on a verdict. In such event the purpose of law to protect society
from those guilty of crimes frequently would be frustrated by denying
courts power to put the defendant to trial again.... What has been said
is enough to show that a defendant's valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated
to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.

And in Etter v. State52 the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized six
situations as being well recognized occasions which would warrant the
discharge of a jury without jeopardy attaching:
Certain conditions, if arising in the trial of a case, have come to be
well recognized as constituting the occasion which will warrant the discharge of a jury, and, if they appear of record, will bar a plea of former
jeopardy. These conditions are set forth in Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol.
I, page 549, as: "(1) Consent of the prisoner; (2) illness of (a) one
of the jurors, (b) the prisoner, or (c)the court; (3) absence of a juryman; (4) impossibility of the jurors agreeing on a verdict; (5) some
untoward accident that renders a verdict impossible; and (6) extreme
and overwhelming physical or legal necessity."
In State v. Maouf. 3 the trial court had granted a mistrial because of
illness of the state's chief witness at the first trial and on a second trial
sustained a plea of former jeopardy. The Supreme Court held that
this factual situation (the illness of a chief witness) met the test of
being an "extreme and over-whelming physical or legal necessity,"
and that therefore the plea of former jeopardy should not have been
sustained by the trial court.
In Davis v. State54 the defendant had been convicted under an
indictment charging possession of untaxed whiskey. His motion for
new trial was granted by the trial court. Before the second trial the
state entered a nolle prosequi as to the first indictment after having
obtained another indictment charging possession of unstamped whiskey, based on the same occurrance. At the second trial his plea of
former jeopardy was overruled by the trial court. The Supreme Court
affirmed. Notwithstanding the technicality of the entering of the nolle
prosequi by the state, manifestly it was at the insistence of the defendant that the new trial was granted so that he is, in effect, estopped
to plead the former jeopardy as a bar.
Sentences: An earlier case,5 5 in which it was held that the statute 5
authorizing the trial court to commit a prisoner to the county workhouse rather than the penitentiary in cases where the sentence given
for a felony was for five years or less did not authorize such commitment when the maximum sentence was more than five years, was
52. 185 Tenn. 218, 223, 205 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1947).
53. 287 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1956).

54. 282 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1955).
55. West v. State, 140 Tenn. 358, 204 S.W. 994 (1918).
56. TEN.

CODE ANN. § 40-3105 (1956).
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found to have been overruled in Graham v. State.5 7 The court there
held that the commitment to the workhouse was within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
In Cates v. State8 it was held that although the General Sessions
Court of Sumner County had authority to sentence the defendant to
confinement for ninety days, it had no authority to suspend the
sentence; and thus, action taken to revoke the purported suspension was void. The ultimate conclusion by the court that the defendant is subject to the original sentence of the general sessions
court could leave him, of course, where he started from. The quantum
of proof necessary to support a revocation of a suspended sentence
was considered in Thompson v. State.59
Record: That the "jury book" kept by the clerk is not a part of the
record in a criminal case was so held in Bailey v. State,-0 and therefore
the trial court is not authorized by the statute6' permitting "mistakes
apparent on the face of the record" to be corrected at any time in the
discretion of the court, to add the name of a twelfth juror inadvertently
omitted from the judgment in a case, by referring to the jury book.
Habitual Offender: Although the Tennessee procedure on charging
habitual criminality6 2 had been amended even before the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Chandler v. Fretag,63 to require
that notice of the intention to try one as an habitual criminal be contained in the indictment or presentment, the initial sentences of
those convicted of a felony and of habitual criminality under the prior
practice are still expiring. In Rhea v. Edwards64 such a case, i.e., of
one convicted in 1950 of armed robbery and of being an habitual criminal, was before the federal district court on a petition for habeas
corpus. That court held that the failure to formally notify the defendant that he was to be tried as an habitual criminal, under the
prior practice, constituted a denial of due process of law in contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
and that the statute as it then existed was accordingly void.
57. 279 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1955). The earlier precedent having been overruled by Gilliam v. State, 174 Tenn. 388, 126 S.W.2d 305 (1939).
58. 279 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1955).
59. 279 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. 1955).

60.
61.
62.
63.

280 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. 1955).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1513 (1956); compare id. § 20-1512.
Id. 40-2803 (1956).

348 U.S. 3 (1954), in which it was held that there was a denial of due

process in denying the prisoner the opportunity to obtain and consult with
counsel after he was notified, at the trial, of the intent to try him on habitual
criminal charges.
64. 136 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).

